A quarter of a century of the BoJ’s efforts to overcome liquidity trap

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Abstract
Japan was the first country to experience sustained deflationary threat since the late 1990s. It stemmed from a mixture of factors of different natures, out of which domestic structural rigidities and the Great Moderation played the key role. Confronting these pressures were not easy for the Bank of Japan (BoJ). This process was lengthy and associated mistakes in monetary policy decisions proved to be unavoidable, but it led to the transition of the BoJ from an obsolete institution into a bold, innovative central bank, which since 2013 has started to set new trends in the monetary policies worldwide. Inflation, however, remained well below the 2% price stability target for most of the time over the recent decade. Inflation has begun to exceed the target significantly since early 2022. However, the BoJ stresses that the current high inflation is unsustainable due to temporary external factors and that it will fall below 2% in the near future. The ability to keep inflation at around 2% depends on sustainable wage and demand growth, as well as on the policies pursued by Kuroda’s successor.

Keywords: monetary policy, yield curve control, quantitative and qualitative monetary easing, negative interest rate policy, the Bank of Japan

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1. Introduction

The end of Haruhiko Kuroda’s 10-year long term in office (from March 2013 to April 2023) as governor of the Bank of Japan (BoJ) marks an important milestone in the Japanese monetary policy. Under his governorship, Japan gradually shifted away from deflation, and started to move towards a path of achieving the 2% price stability target over the medium term. Kuroda was renowned for introducing the quantitative and qualitative monetary easing (QQE) in the early days of his term. In 2016, under his term, the BoJ introduced the yield curve control (YCC) with simultaneous efforts to continue buying selected Japanese financial assets. The aim of reaching an inflation level above the 2% mark has been accomplished since April 2022. However, the reasons behind the current inflation pressure are of external nature, out of which supply-side factor as well as the depreciation of the yen – reflecting the interest differentials with the United States – seem to be the key factors.

Regardless of the sustainability of the current levels of inflation in Japan, the end of Kuroda's term is a good opportunity to review the whole of BoJ’s efforts aimed to bring either deflation or excessively low inflation to an end. After all, efforts aimed to reverse deflationary pressures started in the late 1990s well before Kuroda's emergence in the world of central banking. The aim of this article is to review the entire period during which the BoJ was almost entirely focused on engineering inflation, which is needed to ensure demand-driven economic growth.\footnote{This is a shorter version of the ADBI Working Paper (History of Bank of Japan’s more than two decades of unconventional monetary easing with special emphasis on the frameworks pursued in the last 10 years) published in May 2023.}

The first part of this article is dedicated to a brief description of the factors which generated the so called bubble economy led by real estate and stock price hikes in the second half of the 1980s. The bubble burst in the early 1990s pushed Japan into structural problems, out of which deflation proved perhaps to be the toughest one. Then this article presents efforts undertaken by the BOJ at that time, when long term deflation seemed to be a Japanese peculiarity. Special attention is placed on factors which led to the emergence of a new kind of monetary policies, commonly known under the name of unconventional monetary policies.

The outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis in 2008–2009 changed the prevalent perception of deflation. All of a sudden it was understood that deflation threat is not confined to Japan. Unconventional monetary policies, with which the BoJ had experimented earlier, started to be a new reference point for other major central banks. With almost all major central banks having rather modest results in combating the deflationary threat in early 2010s, it was up to the BoJ to break the impasse and add a new dimension to its established policies. The emergence of the Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (and his subsequent decision to nominate Kuroda as the new BoJ Governor) helped the BoJ substantially in adding new impetus to its monetary policies. Their detailed description is the cornerstone of this article.

The outbreak of the two crises (the Covid-19 pandemic and the Russian-Ukrainian war) caused the BoJ policies under Kuroda's governorship to evolve until the last days of Kuroda's term in office. This sequence of events makes it even harder to assess this particular chapter in the history of the BoJ. Still, such an attempt has been made in the present article with the authors being fully aware that history is probably yet to verify its accuracy.
2. The preceding era and the background leading to enhanced monetary easing experiment in 2013

2.1. The economic and financial situation in the 1990s

Japan’s problems with low inflation go back at least to the Plaza Agreement in September 1985. Prior to this agreement, Japan’s overall economic performance was still impressive. Even if the two oil shocks have slowed Japan’s economic growth considerably compared to the performance prior to the end of the Bretton Woods system, the average growth of around 4% was beyond the level of other industrial economies and invited worldwide admiration. The Japanese government also wished to get global recognition for their achievements and to be accepted as one of the crucial economic partners of the global community. This implied that Japan needed to take more responsibility for processes taking place outside its domestic economy. Deeper involvement in some of the global issues could only be achieved at the expense of an internal economic equilibrium.

The first real opportunity to test Japan’s commitment to the international environment took place in the mid-1980s, at the time when the problems of substantial US trade deficits became the centre of global economic issues. The trade deficits were viewed as partially attributable to the US dollar’s sharp appreciation, which in turn was a side effect of sharp monetary tightening introduced by the Federal Reserve (Fed) in the early 1980s. Thus, engineering a reversal of US trade imbalances with Japan and Germany through intervening in foreign exchange markets was agreed as top priority at the G-5 meeting held at the Plaza Hotel in New York. The appreciation of the yen in less than 2 years (as a result of which the value of the dollar denominated in yen dropped by more than a half) generated a heavy shock to the Japanese economy relying heavily on exports. In order to compensate for such a sharp appreciation, monetary policy was loosened substantially. As a result of this loosening, bubbles in the real estate and stock prices emerged. As the bubbles reached an unsustainable level, the BoJ attempted to tighten its monetary policy from May 1989 to August 1990 (the official discount rate rising from 2.5% to 6%), thus reversing its previous policies.

By 1993 Japan was already in deep recession and first deflationary signs in Japan emerged as early as 1994. The BoJ was rather quick to act (Itoh, Morita, Ohnuki 2020). It ceased its obsolete policies: it abolished the Window Guidance, accomplished a deregulation of the money markets and cut interest rates to an all-time low (in September 1995 they reached a level of 0.5%). It was also granted operational independence from the government. However, low interest rates were unable to solve all structural rigidities in the domestic economy. Furthermore, such a low level of interest rates left little room for further stimulus should a need arise. And the latter was quick to emerge as the country was hit by a combination of external (the Asian economic crisis of 1997–1998) and internal (the domestic banking crisis) shocks. All of a sudden the newly independent BoJ was to face the liquidity trap, while recessionary tendencies were augmented by the strengthening of the yen (which after a spell of weakness in mid-1998 started to appreciate shortly afterwards).

2.2. Efforts aimed to address the liquidity trap

The year 1999 proved crucial as the BoJ started to implement in a pioneering manner measures which later came to be perceived as ingredients of unconventional monetary policies.
Unconventional monetary policy is a term that has undergone enormous transformation through time. Nowadays, unconventional monetary policy can be relatively easily defined. For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA) defines unconventional policy as any policy that occurs when tools other than changing a policy interest rate are used. These tools include forward guidance, asset purchases, term funding facilities, adjustments to market operations and negative interest rates. The BIS (2019) shares a similar view and refers to monetary policy as unconventional measures targeted at something other than short-term interest rates. According to the same definition, some measures were designed to affect term spreads (or, equivalently, long-term risk-free rates), while others were directed at influencing liquidity and credit spreads (or, equivalently, interest rates on various non risk-free instruments). Sticking further to the BIS definition, some authors think that nonconventional measures have to focus on other variables than the short-term interest rate. As examples of such variables they pointed to term spreads (or, equivalently, long-term risk free rates), liquidity and credit spreads (or, equivalently, interest rates on various non-risk free instruments) and financial stability as a means to support the monetary policy transmission mechanism (Bindseil 2016). With these tools, central banks became intermediaries for a larger range of financial activities (BIS 2019). They stepped in to fill the gap created by the receding activity of private sector participants, thereby also affecting participants’ incentives. Smaghi stated that unconventional tools included a broad range of measures aimed at easing financing conditions (Smaghi 2009). According to him, these may range from providing additional central bank liquidity to banks to directly targeting liquidity shortages and credit spreads in certain market segments. The policy makers then have to select measures that best suit those objectives. Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) adopted a shorter definition and perceived it as a shift from short-term interest rates to the monetary base.

On 12 February 1999, the BoJ implemented the so-called Zero Interest Rate Policy (ZIRP). Kuttner (2014) explained that it was not all about literally pursuing a 0% rate. The BoJ was supposed to provide ample funds and encourage the uncollateralised overnight call rate to decline as much as possible. Furthermore, the expansionary effect of the ZIRP was augmented by the introduction of forward guidance in April 1999, which consisted of a commitment according to which ZIRP would be continued “until deflationary concern is dispelled”. The ZIRP with forward guidance could be viewed as the beginning of the era of the BoJ’s unconventional monetary easing.

A reliance on the ZIRP with forward guidance to many experts seemed insufficient. In late 1999, Ben Bernanke (1999) urged the BoJ to take bolder steps. However, the BoJ, after obtaining independence with regard to the conduct of monetary policy, was wary of launching any aggressive monetary easing experiments. Furthermore, unfavourable demographic trends led by the decline in working age population of 15–64 year olds from 1996 onwards, as well as fears that zero interest rates could affect adversely a rising number of pensioners (who were dependent on their bank savings) were perhaps some of the key reasons why the BoJ opted to bring its ZIRP to an end prematurely. Soon after its decision to raise interest rates in August 2000, the IT bubble in the US collapsed and this development coupled with the associated economic slowdown nurtured the perception that the BoJ’s exit decision was one of the greatest mistakes in the BoJ’s monetary policy history (Orphanides 2004). To cope with deteriorated economic performance the BoJ decided to take a new action within seven months. The BoJ worked out a new policy framework and paved the way to quantitative easing. In those days, this new policy tool was supposed to be restricted to Japan only.

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2.3. The quantitative easing policy (QEP): 2001–2006

In the wake of these circumstances prevailing in Japan at the end of 2000, the BoJ opted to behave in a very pragmatic way. It did not turn a deaf ear to Bernanke's proposal, but the BoJ opted to launch it in line with its own preferences. Thus, the quantitative easing policy (QEP) was conceived and introduced on 19 March 2021. And this move was subordinated to one prerequisite: cautiousness. The BoJ decided to use some of its experience gained in the previous decade. The result of this mix was a milestone in the history of both central banking and monetary policy. This new framework came to be known as one of major ingredients of the so called “unconventional monetary policies” toolkit.

The adoption of the quantitative easing policy in March 2001 implied that the BoJ had to provide additional funds to financial institutions that did not have incentives to hold a large amount of excess reserves.

Shirai (2018) described this policy as reserve targeting since the operation target was switched from the uncollateralised overnight call rate to the outstanding balance of current accounts at the BoJ. The target was set initially at JPY 5 trillion and surpassed the level of required reserves by JPY 1 trillion. After 9 upward adjustments, the target reached a range spreading from JPY 30 trillion to JPY 35 trillion (Figure 1).

Figure 1
The BoJ current account balance during 2001–2006

The QEP was implemented in a rather gradual manner. There were neither measures aimed to exert any influence nor to reduce the spreads at the long end of the curve (Kuttner 2014). Aiming at encouraging financial institutions to hold their funds on the BoJ current account, the BoJ started to purchase different kinds of assets, including bills received from banks, Treasury Discount Bills
(T-Bills) and Japanese government bonds (JGB). Both Shirai (2018) and Kuttner (2014) point out that the maturities of these purchased assets were at the short end of the curve. According to Kuttner (2014), the average maturity of JGB in the BoJ portfolio in 2005 fell from six years to less than four years.

Separately from the QEP, from November 2002 until September 2004 the BoJ started to purchase equities directly from banks aiming at stabilizing the financial system – not as a monetary easing policy tool. A purchase of equities rated BBB minus or higher was made to mitigate market risk associated with banks’ holding of stocks and thus to expedite the disposal of non-performing loans (Shirai 2020). The total amount of stock purchase amounted to about JPY 2 trillion.

The QEP came to an end exactly 5 years after its inception in March 2006. At the same time, a decision was announced to reintroduce the standard uncollateralised overnight call rate as a policy target for market operations instead of the outstanding balance of current accounts at the BoJ. The new target for the uncollateralised overnight call rate was set at effectively 0%.

At the March 2006 Monetary Policy Meeting, the BoJ adopted a new framework for the conduct of monetary policy by introducing a longer-run inflation outlook – the so-called understanding of medium-to-long-term price stability. This is the level of the CPI inflation rate recognised as price stability by each member of the Policy Board of the BoJ. An agreement was reached among board members that the inflation rate would remain approximately between zero and 2% with the median of 1%. It was also agreed that the rate would be reviewed annually (Shirai 2018). This agreement was not an announcement of a single-digit inflation target yet (for which Japan had to wait almost another seven years until January 2013).

The move away from quantitative easing contributed to a decline in the current account by about 2/3 of its value. However, the QEP cannot be described as a complete failure, especially when one takes into consideration economic indicators other than inflation, as does the present article. Attention should be paid primarily to economic growth. After bottoming out in Q1 2003, the domestic economy started to grow almost in an uninterrupted manner until Q2 2007. Between 2004 and 2007 alone, the economic growth amounted to almost 2% on average. When it comes to inflation, achievements of the first QEP in boosting it were far more modest. Inflation level in the period under review oscillated around 0% (Kuttner 2014) (Figure 2). This must have been a disappointing result, as the policies pursued in the period under review coincided with a massive increase in the prices of commodities and a depreciating yen (which started to weaken as a result of carry trade becoming ever more profitable for investors). On the other hand, this was also a period, when the so-called “Great Moderation” was setting in and depressing inflation in many industrialised countries.

As the deregulation of money markets and interest rate liberalization was completed in 1994, the BoJ shifted from the official discount rate to a new market-based policy rate (uncollateralised overnight call rate). From January 2001, the official discount rate was replaced formally by the “basic discount rate and basic loan rate”. Even after 2001, however, the label of the official discount rate was still used in monetary policy statements. The basic discount rate and the basic loan rate were supposed to function as a upper bound on the uncollateralized overnight market rate.

Depending on the way that the GDP is gauged, there was a least one quarter of negative growth, namely the third quarter of 2006. However, this fall did not undermine the fact that from the end of Q1 2003 to the end of Q2 2007, the nominal GDP grew from JPY 521,346 billion (the lowest nominal GDP level since mid-1995) to JPY 542,279 billion. The QEP finished in March 2006, but its effects were felt for at least a few more quarters. That is why this paper extends the analysis beyond the first quarter of 2006. Source: Statistics Dashboard – Graph Screen (e-stat.go.jp).

Carry trade refers to an FX strategy which consists in borrowing in a low interest currency and investing the obtained funds in a currency bearing higher interest rates. At the time of the QEP, the currency of choice for investors was the New Zealand dollar. Still, carry trade was not confined to the NZ dollar, but involved other currencies as well (the US dollar including).
The aforementioned increase in energy prices and higher utility prices led to the achievement of 0% core inflation in October 2005 and positive figures in the following months. These favourable price developments made the BoJ decide to terminate the QEP and tighten its monetary policy. From the end of June 2006 to the beginning of May 2007, the uncollateralised overnight call rate was raised from 0% to 0.5%. The current account continued to shrink further and by January 2007 it fell to approximately JPY 7.5 trillion before recovering somewhat and then oscillated below JPY 10 trillion until the outbreak of the Great Financial Crisis.

Figure 2
The rate of CPI change in Japan in 2000–2006

As for the several definitions of unconventional monetary policies reviewed earlier in this article, the BoJ’s initial action seemed to fit the definition described by Cúrdia and Woodford (2010). To be more precise, the BoJ substituted its short-term policy rate with the amount outstanding of its current account as an operational target.

The world needed some time to digest the QEP as the QEP was supposed to reinforce the ZIRP encompassing the period stretching from March 2001 and March 2006 (Westelius 2020). This is why it is also known under a combination of two acronyms (ZIRP + QEP). Initially, a purchase of assets under the QEP was perceived as some characteristic unique for Japan. But as the time progressed, this particular framework started to move beyond Japan. The aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis saw other major economies importing this framework from Japan – although these central banks increased asset purchases without explicitly targeting the current account balances at the central bank like the BoJ had. And during the recent pandemic crises also selected emerging economies chose to follow the BoJ’s QEP.
2.4. The Great Financial Crisis – an exogenous affair

Once the Great Financial Crisis hit the world economy in 2008, Japan was not in its epicenter. The reasons for the GFC should be sought in the Western Hemisphere (Vollmer, Bebenroth 2012). Even if Japan was slow in addressing its own banking crisis (since the 1990s), reforms had been ultimately implemented, and subsequently Japanese financial institutions fared much better than their European peers, not to mention the US ones. These conclusions are echoed in Sato (2009) and Nakaso (2016). All these features offered little comfort, as given the ever rising Japan’s external trade dependence, Japan could not remain immune to the GFC. This feature is strongly emphasised by Kawai and Takagi (2009). Similar conclusions can be drawn from research conducted at the IMF by Sommer (2009). In other words, it was impossible for Japan to remain immune to the events taking place in the Western Hemisphere.

Being a pioneer in implementing QEP, the BoJ most probably was well aware of its constraints. And being in a totally different position compared to the main casualties of the GFC (who became frontrunners in pursuing unconventional policies), the BoJ needed more time to design a suitable response to the needs of the domestic economy where the relatively stable financial sector stood in stark contrast to the adversely affected real sector.

The BoJ initial response was to reverse earlier rate increases. In October 2008, the policy rate was cut to 0.3% and two months later to 0.1%. The turn of 2008 and 2009 saw a launch of several lending facilities, which had hardly any major and sustainable effect on the credit action. A rather modest monetary easing reaction from the BoJ (compared to other major central banks) only encouraged foreigners to invest in yen assets. As time progressed and other banks were resorting to even more expansionary policies, the demand for yen started to gather momentum. The BoJ could not remain indifferent. On 15 September 2010, as a result of the yen upward trend, the MoF with an intermediation through the BoJ decided to intervene in the foreign exchange market for the first time in six years by purchasing foreign currencies.

2.5. Launch of the comprehensive monetary easing (CME)

Meanwhile, it was the launch in October 2010 of a new program under the name of comprehensive monetary easing (CME) which set a new chapter in the BoJ history of operational monetary policy. Among measures within the CME, the uncollateralised overnight call rate was lowered further to a range of 0–0.1%. Another important element of the CME was the asset purchase programme. The scope of assets covered by this programme was more extensive than that covered under the previous QEP pursued from March 2001 to March 2006. Apart from JGB (Figure 3) and T-Bills, it also embraced both commercial papers, corporate bonds, exchange traded funds (ETFs), and the Japanese Real Estate Investment Trusts (J-REITs). The remaining maturity of JGBs to be purchased was initially set at up to two years. In April 2012 it was raised to up to 3 years.

The CME is again being perceived by market participants and experts to have been a programme implemented without sufficient vigour. Between October 2010 and March 2013, the amount of JGB rose by approximately 60% (from around JPY 55.5 trillion to a little more than JPY 91.3 trillion). An average yield of bonds with maturities spreading from 1Y to 3Y fell from almost 0.14% in the final
days of September 2010 to slightly above 0.05% in March 2013. As for 10Y bonds (which were not targeted within CME), their yield recorded a slightly less pronounced fall, from around 0.94 to around 0.55% (with much of this fall materializing in the final month – most probably as a result of speculation concerning a shift in policy). However, a comparison of the increase in balance sheets of the BoJ and the Fed does not point to lack of vigour. While the BoJ balance sheet during the period under review rose approximately by 37%, the Fed's balance sheet increased by slightly more than 39%. This shows that there was no significant difference in terms of the rate of balance sheet expansion between the two central banks.

CME’s efficiency was overshadowed by various external shocks. During its lifespan, several financial tensions stemmed from the eruption of the euro area’s sovereign crisis and its escalation, the US Treasury securities’ downgrade (as a result of which the world largest economy lost its AAA rating in August 2011), etc. But there was one important domestic shock, one that erupted on 11 March 2011, that is the Great East Japanese Earthquake and nuclear power plant accident. This natural disaster a week later generated the first coordinated FX intervention in more than a decade among G-7 economies aimed at reversing the excessive appreciation of the yen. This was not the only time when BoJ had to intervene in the market in 2011. A combination of the US downgrading in August 2011 and the escalation of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area turned the yen again into a safe haven currency. In the whole Q4 2011, the MoF bought almost JPY 9.1 trillion. Only the Q1 2004 saw higher interventions (JPY 14.8 trillion...)
but with no single intervention even approaching the level recorded on 31 October 2011). In spite of heavy intervention, the yen continued to appreciate further. In early 2012 it fell again to a level close to USD/JPY 76 (Figure 4). This was not an environment to fight deflationary pressures in the domestic economy. Furthermore, the BoJ seemed to face yet again the liquidity trap as its policies proved incapable to tackle the problems of the domestic economy. It became more and more evident than tackling the aforementioned problems was beyond the scope of monetary policies.

Figure 4
The USD/JPY in 2008–2013

Source: prepared by the authors based on the BoJ database.

3. The era and the background leading to the initiation of unprecedent monetary easing under Kuroda and the following ten years

3.1. Shinzo Abe, his three arrows and the advent of Haruhiko Kuroda

On 16 November 2012, the then Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda announced the dissolution of the lower house of the Japanese Parliament; a decision that paved the way to general elections, which were held on 16 December 2012. Elections were won by the Liberal Democratic Party. As a result, the leader of the victorious party, Shinzo Abe, became the first Prime Minister to return to office since Shigeru Yoshida in 1948.6 Abe was the longest serving Prime Minister in the history of Japan. If his first term in office was short and rather uneventful, the second one marked a real breakthrough for the world’s

6 For more information about the history of Japan, please see the original version of this paper printed under the auspices of the ADB Institute.
third largest economy. Shinzo Abe was sworn in as the Prime Minister on 26 December 2012. Shortly afterwards, he announced his economic agenda, known under the name of three arrows, where each arrow represented a select item of his economic policy. The first arrow represented monetary easing policy, the second arrow represented flexible fiscal policy and finally the third arrow was meant to depict growth strategy and structural reforms. For obvious reasons, this article will focus on the first arrow.

The year 2012 was an important year from the point of view of defining monetary objectives, as both the Fed and the BoJ undertook decisions of adopting the 2% inflation target (although the BoJ’s approach was rather vague at this stage since it was not a single-digit 2% target). As far as the BoJ is concerned, in February 2012 it introduced its own version of inflation targeting framework by adopting the price stability goal. In its minutes from 13–14 February 2012 the BoJ judged “the price stability goal in the medium to long term” to be within a positive range of 2% or lower in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI and, more specifically, set a goal at 1% for the time being. Prior to the February 2012 decision, the BoJ had been extensively criticised because the previous framework of “understanding of medium- to long-term price stability” was not a common price stability target adopted by the policy board members. It was merely a way to describe a range of inflation rates that each board member understood as price stability from a medium- to long-term viewpoint. Despite the improvement, the price stability goal remained ambiguous since it was not clear whether the BoJ was seeking a 1% or a 2% inflation target.

That is why in January 2013, a significant amendment was made under the new government led by the Prime Minister Abe. In the Minutes from the Monetary Policy Meeting held on 21 and 22 January 2013 it was written, that “Based on this recognition, the Bank sets the price stability target at 2% in terms of the year-on-year rate of change in the consumer price index (CPI).” Shortly afterwards, in February 2013, the new Prime Minister nominated Kuroda as his candidate for the governor of the BoJ. On 20 March 2013 Kuroda became the 31st BoJ governor, succeeding Masaaki Shirakawa. The newly appointed governor did not wait for too long to launch a new chapter in the history of Japanese monetary policy.

### 3.2. Quantitative and qualitative easing (QQE) launched in April 2013

As it was already mentioned, the QEP consisted in a shift of the operational target from the short-term interest rate towards the monetary base. This definition enjoyed such popularity that many observers started to use quantitative easing interchangeably with unconventional monetary policies. Qualitative easing is a more complex story. Its earliest definition is attributed to Willem Buiter. In an interview with the *Financial Times* in late 2008 he defined qualitative easing as a process of increasing the illiquidity and credit risk of the assets on the central bank’s balance sheet by outright purchases of private securities (including, in the limit, equity and corporate debt) (Buiter 2008). Roger E.A. Farmer goes straight to the point by referring to qualitative easing as a change in the asset

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7 The Fed did not use the term inflation target. It opted for inflation goal instead.
8 Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on 13 and 14 February 2012 (boj.or.jp).
9 Minutes of the Monetary Policy Meeting on 21 and 22 January 2013 (boj.or.jp).
10 To be more precise, Buiter used this term even earlier on his ‘Maverecon’ Financial Times blog, which is no longer available in the net.
composition of the central bank (Farmer 2013). Farmer believes that because qualitative easing is conducted by the central bank, it is often classified as a monetary policy. But because it adds risk to the public balance sheet that is ultimately borne by the taxpayer, qualitative easing is better thought of as a fiscal or quasi-fiscal policy (Farmer 2012). Qualitative easing was most probably already a component of other central banks’ attempts (such as the Fed’s and the Bank of England’s) to pursue unconventional monetary policies, but it was the BoJ again, which explicitly used this term in its policy.

At the first Monetary Policy Meeting held on 4 April 2013 under Kuroda’s governorship, the BoJ announced the quantitative and qualitative monetary easing (QQE). Its key aim was to achieve 2% inflation with a time horizon of about two years. The BoJ made it clear that it will not hesitate to continue its program, and even strengthen it, should such a need arise. The monetary policy operation target was changed from the policy interest rate (uncollateralised overnight call rate) to the monetary base. An annual increase in the monetary base was supposed to be somewhere in the range from JPY 60 trillion to JPY 70 trillion. The key elements of these purchases were:

– JGB – with a maturity of up to 40 years, with an average maturity of 6–8 years (7 years),
– Exchange Traded Funds – JPY 1 trillion,

As far as commercial papers and corporate bonds are concerned, the BoJ decided to continue those asset purchases as set in December 2012 and January 2013 under CME, increasing them until their amounts outstanding reached JPY 2.2 trillion and JPY 3.2 trillion, respectively, and thereafter maintaining those amounts outstanding. The whole program was further boosted by forward guidance. Details about ETF purchases are described in Shirai (2020).

As Shirai (2018) explains in her book, the QQE emphasised long-term inflation expectations as one of the most important channels to achieve the 2% inflation target in a stable manner. This was based on the view that higher long-term inflation expectations might help to increase the current levels of prices and wages by accelerating current levels of spending. The BoJ also hoped that an increase in long-term interest rates might lead to a decline in the long-term interest rate in real terms and thus bring in more accommodative monetary conditions. The emphasis on long-term inflation expectations was clearly different from the previous rounds of BoJ’s series of monetary easing including the CME. The sharp depreciation of the yen – starting from November 2012 in anticipation of massive monetary easing under the new governor in the following year – contributed to the increase in long-term inflation expectations (see Figure 5). The yields on JPY Inflation Swap Forward 5Y5Y in November 2012 were negative (falling as low as minus 0.16), six month later, they reached levels above 1% (Figure 5). However, an increase in long-term inflation expectations did not last long since they began to decline from around mid-2014.

Oil prices which only in June 2014 were trading above the level of USD 115 crashed six months later, losing approximately 50% of their value from the June level. Lower oil prices only augmented the decline in long-term inflation expectations. Furthermore, from April 2014, an increase in the so-called consumption tax from 5% to 8% (which was announced by the Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko in 2012) was implemented. While the consumption tax hike raised Japan’s inflation by around 2%, it reduced households’ consumption and weakened economic growth. All these factors were the reasons for an upward revision of parameters of the QQE, which took place on 31 October 2014.
The most important change was the BOJ’s decision to accelerate the annual pace of increase in the monetary base – the main operating target for money market operations – from about JPY 60–70 trillion to about JPY 80 trillion (an addition of about JPY 10–20 trillion). To achieve this monetary base targeting, the amount outstanding of JGB holdings was increased from an annual quota of about JPY 50 trillion to about JPY 80 trillion (an addition of about JPY 30 trillion). Furthermore, with a view to encouraging a further decline in interest rates across the entire yield curve, the BoJ extended the average remaining maturity target of JGB purchases from about 7 years (6–8 years) to about 7–10 years and called this “an extension of about 3 years maximum”. In addition to the JGBs, the BoJ decided to increase purchases of risk assets such as ETFs and J-REITs, tripling their amounts outstanding and increasing their annual pace of purchase from about JPY 1 trillion to about JPY 3 trillion and from about JPY 30 billion to about JPY 90 billion, respectively. The BoJ also included the ETFs that track the JPX–Nikkei Index 400 as ETFs eligible for purchase.

Higher parameters of the QQE only increased the already existing gap between the BoJ and other major central banks. By the end of 2014, the BoJ balance sheet surged above the symbolic threshold of JPY 300 trillion (Figure 6). In early 2015, the ratio of the BoJ’s balance sheet to nominal GDP was approaching a threshold of 60% – a very high level compared to almost 25% in the case of the Fed, 22% in the case of the Bank of England and only 17.6% for the ECB (which was yet to launch its Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP) in March 2015). The same was true for the monetary base, which in case of the BoJ exceeded 54% of nominal GDP compared to 23.4%, 20.8%, and 11.9% for the Fed,
the Bank of England and the ECB, respectively. 11 By the late 2015, the ratio of the BoJ balance sheet to GDP was approaching a threshold of 75%.

Figure 6
The BoJ’s financial and other assets in 2013–2015

![Graph showing BoJ's financial and other assets in 2013–2015](image)

Source: prepared by the authors based on the BoJ database.

Even though these numbers were impressive, in April 2015 – two years since the inception of the QQE – the BoJ was not able to achieve the 2% price stability target as envisaged initially. According to its original schedule, its aims should have been achieved at around that particular time. Excluding the direct impact of the April 2014 consumption tax hike, which led to an increase in inflation of around 2 percentage points lasting until March 2015, the 2% price stability target was not achieved in a sustainable manner.

To make things worse, Japan was also subject to spillovers from stock market volatility emanating from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The collapse of a bubble in PRC’s stock prices in June 2015, the modification of the second largest economy’s exchange policy in August 2015, as well as economic slowdown in PRC gave rise to instability in both the real and the financial sectors worldwide including Japan. In September 2015, the CPI in Japan fell to 0%, while the CPI excluding fresh food reached a negative level a month before. At the end of 2015, more and more signs were pointing to an imminent need of far reaching modifications of the QQE.

3.3. Negative interest rate policy (NIRP) announced in January 2016

On 29 January 2016, the BoJ became the fifth major central bank to announce an introduction of a negative interest rate policy (NIRP) in the following month. This announcement by the BoJ surprised market participants. Negative interest rates on deposits hardly suited the logic of monetary policies pursued by any monetary authorities resorting to large purchases of assets. This is an important caveat, since introducing negative rates can discourage investors from selling their assets to the central bank (Shirai 2018). After all, much of the funds coming from the sales of these assets ends on the current account of a central bank. That is why negative interest rates were used neither in the United Kingdom nor the US. In spite of a reluctance towards this concept in the Anglo-Saxon countries, negative interest rates are not a new concept.

The BoJ cannot claim a pioneering role in introducing negative rates. Among central banks, the first one to implement them was the oldest central bank in the world, the Swedish Riksbank. In July 2009, it lowered the deposit rate to -0.25%, which was a side effect of bringing the reference rate to 0.25%. This move had almost no impact on money market conditions in Sweden. The fact is that the Swedish Riksbank conducted fine tuning operations in which the aim was to ensure that the market (overnight) rate did not deviate too far (more precisely more than +/-10 basis points) from the reference rate. In other words, Swedish banks did not experience negative deposit interest rates between 2009 and 2010.

In a search for a case where negative interest rates had a binding effect, the case of Denmark must be mentioned. In July 2012, the Danmarks Nationalbank introduced a negative interest rate on the so-called certificates of deposit. The Danish banks could then deposit their surpluses either on a current account or on certificates of deposit. The negative interest rate applied to the latter, while the former bore 0%. In order to make negative interest rates binding, there was a strictly limited amount of funds banks could hold on the current account (until March 2021, when the two rates were unified). The limit of funds to be held on the current account could even be perceived as an extra instrument in the central bank's toolkit, which was used quite often. A very similar policy was applied in Switzerland, where the Swiss National Bank (SNB) resorted to the so-called threshold factor which defined the amount exempted from interest rates. In the case of the SNB the threshold factor in a modified version continues to be used even after the NIRP came to an end.12

The ECB implemented negative deposit rates in June 2014 before launching its asset purchase programme (APP) (October 2014), while the Riksbank cut its reference rate below zero simultaneously with the launch of its purchase assets in February 2015.13 Unlike the Danish and Swiss central banks, both the ECB and the Riksbank were very stringent in applying negative rates, leaving almost no possibility to avoid them (Bech, Malkhozov 2016). In the case of the ECB, it was only the minimum reserve requirement (with interest at 0%) that offered a way out, and Sweden did not leave any leeway at all (as the Riksbank does not apply reserve requirements any more). The BoJ opted to follow the example of Denmark and Switzerland, even if the exchange rate remained beyond its interest for quite a long time (until 2022).

In order to avoid inconsistency in its policies (the scale of purchases of bonds was far higher in Japan than in the euro area and Sweden), the BoJ not only opted for a leeway but it made this leeway

12 Swiss National Bank (SNB) – Current interest rates and exchange rates.
more sophisticated. The implementation of negative interest rates in Japan paved the way to an introduction of a three-tier deposit system, where funds held by banks were divided in three sub-categories (Figure 7). Only one of them was exposed to the effect of negative rates.

Thus, the BoJ introduced the following three types of deposit rates (Shirai 2018):

- **Tier 1: Basic Balance**: a positive interest rate of 0.1% would be applied,
- **Tier 2: Macro Add-on Balance**: a zero interest rate would be applied,
- **Tier 3: Policy-Rate Balance**: a negative interest rate of minus 0.1% would be applied.

**Basic Balance (Tier 1)** includes the outstanding balance of the current account at the BoJ that each financial institution accumulated under QQE. The BoJ would continue to apply the same interest rate as before. The average outstanding balance of the current account which each financial institution held during benchmark reserve maintenance periods from January 2015 to December 2015 corresponded to the existing balance and was regarded as the basic balance to which a positive interest rate of 0.1% would be applied.

**Macro Add-on Balance (Tier 2)** would refer to the amount outstanding of the required reserves held by financial institutions subject to the Reserve Requirement System. Tier 2 also referred to the amount outstanding of the BoJ’s provision of credit through the Loan Support Program and the Funds-Supplying Operation to Support Financial Institutions in Disaster Areas Affected by the Great East Japan Earthquake to financial institutions that were using these programs.

**Policy Rate Balance (Tier 3)** would refer to the outstanding amount exceeding the two above mentioned balances (Tier 1 and Tier 2).

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**Figure 7**
Amount outstanding of the BoJ’s current account balance

![Graph showing three tiers of deposit rates](image)

Source: prepared by the authors based on the BoJ database.
Figure 7 illustrates how the three-tier deposit operated. As can be gauged both from the description and the graphic above, the BoJ took every possible effort to minimise the scale of damage of negative interest rates from the point of view of government bond sale. In other words, most of these purchases were not affected by the impact of negative rates. It is important to emphasise that each tier was to be adjusted over time in order to preserve the share of banks’ funds exposed to negative interest rates at a relatively small level (somewhere between JPY 10 trillion and JPY 30 trillion).

Figure 8
The slope of the Japanese yield curve (difference between 10-year yield and 1-year yield) in 2013–2017

Source: prepared by the authors based on the Bloomberg database.

The introduction of the NIRP had one major side effect, namely a significant flattening of the yield curve. This appears to have exceeded BoJ’s expectation. At the turn of 2015 and early 2016, the spread in yields between 10 year- and 1-year bonds hovered around 30 basis points (Figure 8). It then fell in mid-2016 to single digit levels (as low as 8 basis points). This state of affairs started to pose a certain threat to the financial system’s stability, especially to institutional investors such as pension funds and insurance companies, which by definition prefer an upward slope yield curve – thus prompting the BoJ to undertake further action.

3.5. The yield curve control (YCC) announced in September 2016

After only 8 months since introducing negative interest rates, the BoJ opted to launch a new strategy, known under the name of the yield curve control (YCC). It was a well deliberated decision. The then
BoJ’s Executive Director, Masayoshi Amamiya presented a detailed historical review of the YCC concept (Amamiya 2017). In this review, he mentioned that after the introduction of “QQE with a negative interest rate” in early 2016 the purchases of long-term government bonds combined with the application of negative interest rates to a part of the Bank’s current account balances exerted strong downward pressure on the long-term interest rates. Accumulated experiences from the past and lessons learned served the BoJ as a basis for considering the introduction of yield curve control.

As in the case of the negative rates, the BoJ cannot claim a pioneering role in the case of the YCC either. It was the Fed who resorted to this kind of policy as early as the 1940s. But the Fed experiences were not particularly constructive, which is why the YCC was abandoned in the second half of the 20th century. It was not until September 2011, when the story of the YCC was recalled, that the same Fed opted to do something similar to what had been done in the early 1960s. Its action quickly brought memories of Operation Twist. Regardless of Operation Twist, however, large-scale purchase of government bonds by the Fed had to bring associations with the YCC concept. Bringing long term interest rates lower was a priority for many central banks, but it was the BoJ that had enough courage to set an explicit target. The monetary base was substituted by the 10Y yield of newly introduced JGBs and the negative interest rate already adopted earlier as operational targets. From then on, there were two pinpoint targets: a negative interest rate of minus 0.1% (applicable to a part of the outstanding balance of the current account at the BoJ) and the 10Y yield set at around 0%. These two parameters ensured a positive slope of the yield curve.

The YCC was not an easy choice for the BoJ. Continuing the endless QQE implied a risk of excessive concentration of bonds (being in possession of the BoJ) and subsequent liquidity drainage in the JGB market. To make things worse, the yield on 10Y JGBs was negative at the time of introducing the YCC. This is why preserving massive JGB purchases further would have to be translated into higher prices of bonds and the subsequent drop in their yields.

Subsequently, inconsistencies between the YCC and the QQE started to emerge (Borallo Egea, del Rio Lopez 2021). The issue of policy inconsistency is also raised explicitly by Ito (2021). In other words, preserving QQE and the YCC at the same time can be viewed as unsustainable. And one of these two variables had to be given up and determined endogenously.

Indeed, the BoJ began to reduce steadily the annual pace of JGB purchases from JPY 80 trillion since late 2016 onwards (Figure 9). As depicted in the graph below, the number of purchased JGBs fell to levels even below JPY 30 trillion in 2019, thus implying that there was significant room for improvement regarding BoJ’s communication with the markets. Nevertheless BoJ’s lower purchases were quickly spotted by markets participants, who dubbed BoJ policies as tapering by stealth.

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14 Federal Reserve Board – Federal Reserve issues FOMC statement.
16 Borallo Egea and del Rio Lopez refer straight to Shirai’s research to justify their conclusions. So in order to strengthen the case advocated by Shirai, it suffices to get familiar with conclusions drawn at the Bond Market Contact Group (BMCG) organised under the ECB auspices. During the BMCG’s meeting on 7 February 2017, Shirai’s comments were echoed among its participants. Main conclusions of the BMCG meeting of 7 February 2017 (europa.eu). As evidence see the presentation delivered on this particular meeting by Garry Naughton and available in: Yield Curve Control – Lessons from Japan & the US (europa.eu).
Lower JGB purchases were not enough to accommodate the BoJ complex monetary framework. That why the BoJ had to resort to some flexibility as far as the YCC was concerned. Even if the BoJ in the early days of the YCC did not confirm it explicitly, there was an implicit tolerance of +/-10 basis points for the deviation of JGB yields from its target of 0%. In July 2018, however, the tolerance band was explicitly expanded to the width of +/-20 basis points. Its aim was mainly to accommodate market volatility.

In spite of resorting to a very complex framework, there was little progress in approaching the 2% price stability target, not to mention the commitment to exceed it. Inflation was moving almost in parallel with inflation expectations and both parameters seemed to be far more sensible to oil prices (their spike in early 2018 helped push CPI inflation briefly to levels above 1%, before all these gains evaporated a year later). Quite an ambitious Prime Minister Abe’s nominal GDP target (a nominal GDP target of JPY 600 trillion to be achieved by 2020) introduced in September 2015 was becoming difficult to get accomplished either. However, the same year 2020 proved to be an important year for the BoJ as it had to face (like almost every other central bank in the world) the pandemic crisis caused by Covid-19.

### 3.6. The Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on the BoJ’s monetary policies

As the pandemic crisis broke out, the BoJ was about to enter its eighth year of QQE. As an inventor and a pioneer of unconventional policies, the BoJ was aware that the outbreak of the Covid-19 required changes in its policies. Firstly, the challenges the BoJ was facing prior to the crisis were of

![Figure 9](image-url)
macroeconomic nature, but the outbreak of the crisis emphasised the importance of microeconomic dimensions. Secondly, sticking to an increased dynamic of governments bonds purchases was almost impossible in the wake of what was already mentioned as the BoJ saturation (apart from inconsistency with the YCC, there was a problem of scarcity of the purchased bonds).

That is why BoJ response consisted of a two-tier policy. The first tier consisted in further purchases of bonds (at an even higher pace, however with the increase being still far below these observed in the case of Fed or ECB responses) aiming to preserve low interests at the further end of the curve. But it was the second tier that deserves more attention because of its novelty. If the first tier (namely the purchase of assets) proved to be the BoJ invention which was followed by other central banks worldwide, in the case of the second tier it was the BoJ who opted for implementing policies developed earlier by other central banks. What is being referred to here is the funding for lending programmes, invented by the Bank of England (along with UK government) in 2012. Shortly afterwards similar programmes were applied in Hungary and the euro area (targeted longer term refinancing operations). Funding for lending programmes consist of special incentives created by the central banks aimed to encourage the domestic banking system to foster credit action in the economy. And this second tier will be discussed in the following section.

In March 2020 the BoJ launched the special funds-supplying operations to facilitate corporate financing regarding the novel coronavirus (Covid-19). The first loan was offered on 24 March 2020. As the BoJ described in its statement on monetary policy, the aim of these operations was to ensure smooth corporate financing and maintain stability in the financial market, considering the impact of the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (Covid-19) on economic activity.\(^1\) To mitigate the impact of the negative interest rate (minus 0.1%) applied to the outstanding balance of the current account at the BoJ, the BoJ decided to exempt part of the current account from this rate. This exempted amount was set as twice the amount outstanding of loans provided under the new funds-supply operations in the macro add-on balances and a zero percent interest rate was applied to it. A similar approach was applicable to the existing funds-supplying operations.

With the help of this new tool, the BoJ provided loans up to the value of corporate debt pledged as the standing pool of eligible collateral. Initially, the program was supposed to be implemented until September 2020, with a duration of one year and the rate of zero percent per annum. But because of its popularity driven by various incentives, the deadline for new applications for loans were prolonged on several occasions. The first change took place as early as April 2020, when the range of eligible collateral applicable under this scheme was expanded, for example, by including household debt. The number of eligible financial institutions was also increased by accepting smaller financial cooperatives as counterparties. Most importantly, the interest rate applied to BoJ’s outstanding current account balances corresponding to the amounts outstanding of these loans was raised from 0% to 0.1% to promote lending to the private sector. Later in March 2021, the interest rate was raised further to 0.2% if financial institutions provided loans to the private sector under this scheme using their own funds, while the 0.1% interest rate was retained for financial institutions which provided loans to the private sector guaranteed by the Credit Guarantee Corporations and against private debt pledged as collateral. As a charging positive interest rate on the current account balances with the BoJ helped to mitigate the adverse impact of the NIRP, the BoJ expected that the banking sector would be encouraged to extend more credit to the private sector. This facility was scaled down gradually and terminated in March 2023.

\(^1\) Special Funds-Supplying Operations to Facilitate Financing in Response to the Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19), Bank of Japan (boj.or.jp).
The reliance on these aforementioned loans had one more advantage for the BoJ. The loan programme did not contradict the YCC, as it was the case with the QQE. As a result of these aforementioned measures, loans on the asset side of the BoJ increased significantly. The BoJ in its Market Operations in Fiscal Year 2021\(^{18}\) said that loans it offered to banks were utilised by a wide range of sectors and the amount outstanding of the loans increased significantly throughout the fiscal year. If in early 2020 all the BoJ loans were in the region of JPY 48 trillion, their total amount by 2022 increased more than threefold, surpassing the threshold of JPY 150 trillion and representing an increase of over JPY 100 trillion. Prior to the Covid-19 pandemic, the share of all loans offered by the BoJ was less than 10% of the BoJ balance sheets. At the turn of 2021 and 2022 it exceeded 20% before reversing its increases – as the loans had to be duly repaid.

3.7. Revisiting FX interventions became a part of the BoJ’s legacy in the recent decade

One of the intriguing issues concerning the Japanese economy is its currency. Perhaps with the exception of a brief period in 1998, when a combination of the banking and Asian crisis prompted investors to sell the Japanese currency, the yen’s exchange rate never experienced substantial downward pressure. Actually, it was its upward pressure which forced the BoJ to intervene on many occasions.

All this changed since 2022, when almost all central banks worldwide started to tighten their policies to cope with rising inflation triggered by global energy and food price hikes. The BoJ was the only noticeable exception among the developed economies. And this interest rate divergence supported by the YCC was strong enough to generate substantial yen depreciation, as a result of which the yen fell to levels last seen in 1990. The yen exchange rate evidently followed the spread between the US and the Japanese 10Y bonds. The yen fell out of its almost six-year range in early March 2022 and in the following months it fell to levels not seen during Kuroda’s term in office. Apart from the ever rising interest rate differential, there were also geo-political factors at stake. The outbreak of the Russo-Ukrainian war exerted a downward pressure on oil importers’ currencies – which made Japan even more vulnerable to the strength of the US currency (Figure 10).

With other countries (euro area including) deciding to follow the path set by the Fed, the BoJ remaining faithful to its ultraloose policies had no other choice than to defend the value of its currency. As far as FX interventions themselves are concerned, these were large-scale purchases of the yen. In September and October 2022, the BoJ purchased JPY 2.838 trillion and JPY 6.3499 trillion, respectively.\(^{19}\) These were sums large enough to exert an impact on the FX market. In September the BoJ intervened once, while a month later it intervened on two occasions: on 21 October buying JPY 5.62 trillion and on 24 October purchasing an additional JPY 0.7296 trillion. The September intervention brought the yen’s exchange rate against the dollar from the level above 146 yen to levels close to 142 yen. The largest October intervention helped the yen to strengthen from almost USD/JPY 152 to levels close to USD/JPY 144.5.\(^{20}\)

It is difficult to evaluate the efficiency of BoJ interventions. It is true that the yen purchases in October prevented a further fall in the value of the Japanese currency, but they almost coincided with a turn in Fed policies, as a result of which the US central bank diminished the dynamic of its tightening process.


\(^{19}\) Foreign Exchange Intervention Operations (29 September 2022 – 27 October 2022), Ministry of Finance (mof.go.jp).

\(^{20}\) Japan made intervention of at least $30bn to prop up yen, Financial Times (ft.com).
Figure 10
The correlation between the USD/JPY and the spread of the 10-year yields between US and Japanese Government Bonds

Source: prepared by the authors based on the Bloomberg database.

Figure 11
The YCC with lowest (floor) and highest (ceiling) tolerance band

Source: prepared by the authors based on the Bloomberg database.
In spite of the change observed in the way that the Fed conduced its policies, the BoJ opted to ensure more flexibility in its operational policies. This process consisted in expanding in December 2022 its tolerance band around the YCC’s target of 0% from +/-25 basis points to +/-50 basis points (Figure 11). The first four months of 2023 confirm that this was a step in the right direction. Tensions observed in the world banking system (as a result of the Silicon Valley Bank and Credit Suisse problems) did not cause particular tensions from the point of view of preserving the BoJ framework.

3.8. The story of Japanification and the uniqueness of BoJ policies

It is almost impossible to end this article without mentioning the issue of a process known as *Japanification*. The Japanification is the word that is widely understood and frequently used, particularly among experts and the media outside of Japan. It refers to a period of low inflation (or even deflation) and subsequent low interest rates (Wakatabe 2022). Many central banks in the developed economies often referred (prior to Covid-19) to the need of avoiding the Japanification and deflation when they were trying to justify their decisions to launch large-scale monetary easing. Still, such a perception of Japanification seems to be a far reaching oversimplification. Japanification should be perceived as a series of processes which made Japan differ from the rest of the world. One of these processes is demography and the ageing of the Japanese society. The insular character of Japan is another one, which makes labour migration processes more difficult (even compared to another insular country, i.e. the United Kingdom).

And it is the labour market that seems to be essential from the point of view of understanding better the Japanese economy and its challenges related to excessively low inflation. There is an important relationship between wages and prices. In order to see the latter rising, it must be preceded by an increase in the former. There is no doubt that the BoJ tried to stimulate domestic price increases through stimulating domestic demand. However, rather stagnant wages proved to be a factor inhibiting a sustainable increase in the price level. The inability to spur wage hikes stemmed from a particular and rather unique feature of the Japanese labour market. It is exhibits a dual structure (somewhat similar to what occurred in Spain in the late 20th century): the share of non-regular employees (which are far more flexible and whose wages and fringe benefits are lower than for regular workers) starts to grow at the expense of regular employees (generally hired permanently until the official retirement age and whose promotion and wages are based on seniority). The use of non-regular workers was preferred by companies because of the high cost accompanying the lay-off of regular workers and because of their lower wages. Furthermore, the labour market is witness to some structural changes, namely a rising female share of the workforce as well as employment of senior workers, both of them preventing the upward pressure on wages to take hold, although enabling housewives and seniors to increase their household incomes. This wage and employment structure may be attributable to productivity growth.

Indeed, it were the processes in the labour market which took place in the aftermath of the Covid-19 pandemic that contributed to a surge in inflation worldwide. For employers who had to dismiss their staff in the early days of the pandemic, it proved to be impossible to re-hire – once the pandemic came to an end – their former staff on similar terms as prior to its outbreak. Much of this labour force either emigrated somewhere else in a search for new opportunities or simply decided to change professions.

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21 https://www.ft.com/content/9e3f3db-24c8-4daa-bb92-9788cbba1306.
The only way to rehire previously dismissed employees was to raise their remuneration. Whether this pattern described by Harold James in his book *Seven Crashes. The Economic Crises That Shaped Globalization* can be reproduced in Japan is yet to be seen (James 2023).

The Japanification was enhanced by a more global phenomenon, namely the Great Moderation, which generally refers to the period of low growth and low inflation commonly observed among industrial countries since the 1980s. Because of this, even inflationary pressures stemming from higher commodity prices were not strong enough to generate high headline inflation among these economies. Summing up, a combination of Japanification (understood as a conjunction of the Japanese economy’s structural peculiarities) and the Great Moderation were the key obstacles augmenting deflationary pressures and thus inhibiting the BoJ from reaching its goals.

From the early beginning when deflation started to emerge in mid-1990s, the BoJ has been determined to counter deflationary signs in the domestic economy. This determination and resolve paved way to new solutions which nowadays are known as unconventional monetary policy tools. Even if their pioneering character stems most probably from the aforementioned uniqueness of the Japanese economy, it is also the most evident proof of the BoJ’s effort in its search for an efficient framework aimed to ensure stable price growth. These efforts seem not to be always recognised by economists, which we believe is unfair.

In the last 30 years Japan attracted a lot of media attention because of its economic performance. As a result many opinions and theories have been coined, which are neither objective nor fully justified. There is no doubt that the BoJ could have undertaken some decisions in a different manner, but its critique seemed to be excessive. Back then the deflationary threat was considered as a sort of peculiarity linked entirely to the already mentioned uniqueness of the Japanese economy. Indeed, low inflation hit Japan well ahead of other countries renowned for their low inflation track record. Higher inflation in Germany was the side effect of German reunification, but higher inflation in Switzerland stemmed from the SNB’s policy mistakes made in the late 1980s. Yet, its critique (Baltensperger 2012) for these mistakes was nowhere near the intensity of the critique levelled at the BoJ. Even if the last decade of the 20th century is referred to as the lost decade, the simplicity of this verdict does not entirely reflect the complexity of events which took place in Japan at the time. One of them is a sort of silent transformation of the BoJ from a rather obsolete institution almost entirely dependent on the government into a fully independent modern central bank. Without this transformation the BoJ would not have been able to launch a new chapter in the history of central banking.

Launching unconventional policies in the late 1990s was a milestone in the way that monetary policy was run. It is true that it was Ben Bernanke who urged the BoJ to show more boldness in its policies. But there is a difference between offering advice to sort out a problem and implementing policies aimed to solve the same problem. For Bernanke it was easy to describe the exchange rate of the yen as a puzzle. For the BoJ the same exchange rate was an important variable in its monetary framework which could not have been ignored. Many economists point out the excessive caution in the way that the BoJ implemented its policies. These voices again seem to be too harsh. Exposing any economy to new policies requires caution. The Fed under the stewardship of Ben Bernanke was very bold in its policies, as it was a beneficiary of lessons stemming from the BoJ experience with the QEP. This is a great contrast to the BoJ in 2001, which could only rely on theory.

The advent of Kuroda in 2013 is a testament to BoJ’s flexibility in adjusting to prevailing trends in central banking. Under his stewardship, the BoJ not only matched the Fed’s policies in its enormous
A quarter of a century of the BoJ's efforts... bond purchases, but it started to move into uncharted territories. Furthermore, it resorted to a kind of versatility of different frameworks that has so far not been matched by any other central bank in the world. Many of the solutions launched during Kuroda's tenure were an inspiration to other central banks. The Reserve Bank of Australia opted for the YCC, while earlier the ECB decided to introduce leeway aimed to mitigate the effects stemming from negative interest rate policies. As far as this leeway is concerned, both the Danish and Swiss central banks can claim some credit for it, but neither of these banks resorted to a purchase of bonds and negative rates combined. That is why there are reasons to believe that the ECB's two-tier system for remunerating excess reserve holdings could have been inspired by the BoJ solutions launched in early 2016.

The outbreak of Covid-19 was as unexpected for the BoJ as for the rest of central banks all over the world. The only difference between the BoJ and other central banks was the spare capacity to buy additional government bonds. The amount of the JGB bought prior to Covid-19 was close to 90% of the GDP. No other central bank in the world seems to have been exposed to such high risk related to its balance sheet. In the wake of this fact, the bank switched the focus of its easing from quantitative to qualitative (by buying riskier assets and, above all, by loosening its collateral policies). A process of increasing the credit and market risks of the assets on the central bank's balance sheet is further enhanced by the purchase of other securities than JGBs. The BoJ's holdings of foreign currency-denominated bonds are valued at market value.

Ironically, the BoJ, which was berated for years for its lack of boldness, has to be considered one of the most courageous central banks in the world (if not the most courageous). The BoJ's unprecedented efforts were aimed at fulfilling its promises to get Japan out of the deflation trap. It is a matter of debate whether the current rate of inflation is going to be sustainable. Regardless of the answer, one thing seems to be certain: as a result of the BoJ policies pursued during Kuroda's term in office Japan ceased to be as vulnerable to deflation as it used to be prior to Kuroda's advent to power. And this is the reason why Kuroda deserves credit for his achievements.

4. Conclusions and summary

The BoJ efforts to combat deflation go back to the late 1990s, but it was not until Kuroda's arrival that a breakthrough had been reached. The legacy of BoJ policies pursued during Kuroda's tenure offers plenty of room for different interpretations. If the inflation rate – which is driven by higher domestic demand, corporate profits, and resultant wage growth – is taken as the key criterion in judging his achievement, this criterion has not been met yet. It was Kuroda himself who at the end of 2022 offered his own verdict on this particular issue. According to him, Japan's economy as a result of monetary easing policies pursued during his term in office Japan ceased to be in deflation, in the sense of a sustained decline in prices. However, Japan – in the words of its outgoing central banker – has not yet reached a situation where the price stability target of 2% has been achieved in a sustainable and stable manner, accompanied by domestic demand and wage increases (Kuroda 2022).

It is also yet to be seen how the BoJ policies pursued in the last 10 years will be evaluated in the future. Will they be treated as a separate chapter in the Japanese monetary history, or will they be considered in important part of policies whose origins go back to the start of the QEP in March 2001 or even to the ZIRP initiated in February 1999? Both the ZIRP and the QEP were unprecedented
events in the history of economics. With the benefit of hindsight it is a well-known fact that the ZIRP was not pursued long enough, while the QEP could have been more aggressive and decisive. Kuroda’s legacy also depends on how the new governor Kazuo Ueda will treat his predecessor’s policy. So far, he expressed strong support for Kuroda’s monetary easing and his plan to continue it until inflation outlook confirms the achievability of a stable 2% inflation (Shirai 2023a, 2023b). Meanwhile many market participants and experts consider that the current yield curve control should be abandoned sooner without waiting for the achievement of the 2% price stability target because of concerns about the side effects arising from prolonged monetary easing (Watanabe 2023).

The uniqueness of the Japanese economy seems to be fundamental in understanding the complexity of Japanese low inflation phenomenon. However even the Japanese economy cannot remain immune to trends taking place in the world economy. If low inflation was exacerbated by the external processes (the Great Moderation), the same changing external environment may be helpful in overcoming the problem of excessively low inflation. Wakatabe (2022) stated that the world may be in transition from a low inflation period to a period of higher inflation and interest rates. One of the reasons behind this concept is the end of the peace dividend and a subsequent shift towards wartime economy. If history can serve us as a guide, Franklin D. Roosevelt economic policies set in motion in 1933 hardly contributed to the end of deflation (nor even a period of low inflation). It was not until the outbreak of three wars in succession with rather short intervals in between, namely the World War II in the 1940s, the Korean war in the 1950s and the Vietnam war in the 1960s, when deflationary memories disappeared entirely and inflation pressure took hold of the world economy. The war in Ukraine along with a possible escalation of tensions between the People’s Republic of China and Taiwan may fit the logic of an inflationary wartime economy. However, this extremely pessimistic scenario should not be taken for granted. Relying excessively on a shift from the peace dividend towards wartime economy is too risky. The new BoJ governor and its management appear to continue to aim for achieving the 2% price stability target and, together with Japan’s government, may work towards finding a macroeconomic formula which would fit the needs of a modern and highly developed large aging economy. Based on the overview undertaken through this article, it can be concluded that if Japan finds its formula, it will be only a question of time before the rest of the world opts to implement it.

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A quarter of a century of the BoJ’s efforts...


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Ćwierć wieku działań Banku Japonii na rzecz przezwyciężenia pułapki płynności

Streszczenie

Koniec 10-letniej kadencji prezesa Banku Japonii Haruhiko Kurody jest kamieniem milowym w japońskiej polityce pieniężnej. Pod jego rządami w Banku Japonii (BOJ) Japonia stopniowo odchodziła od deflacji i zmierzała w kierunku osiągnięcia 2-procentowego celu stabilności cen w średnim okresie.

Celem artykułu jest ocena skuteczności działań operacyjnych podejmowanych przez Bank Japonii pod kierownictwem Kurody oraz odpowiedzenie na pytanie, czy zdefiniowane w 2013 r. cele banku centralnego zostały osiągnięte za jego kadencji. Dlatego motywem przewodnim tego artykułu jest szczegółowy opis polityki Banku Japonii realizowanej za kadencji Kurody oraz ocena jej skuteczności w obliczu zmieniających się warunków globalnych.


Równoczesne odwoływanie się do wyżej wymienionych wariantów operacyjnych polityki pieniężnej wymagało sporej elastyczności ze strony decydentów Banku Japonii. Rzecz w tym, że skup obligacji przez bank centralny często może stać w sprzeczności z jego działaniami na rzecz zachowania rentowności dziesięcioletnich obligacji na stałym poziomie. Dodatkowo masowy skup obligacji rządowych zaczął negatywnie wpływać na poziom płynności rynku japońskich obligacji rządowych.
Problem ograniczonej podaży obligacji rządowych był jedną z przyczyn tego, że reakcja Banku Japonii na kryzys pandemiczny nieco różniła się od działań podjętych przez Fed czy EBC. O ile w przypadku obu tych banków centralnych znaczne zwiększenie skupu obligacji należało do głównych elementów działań antykryzysowych, o tyle w przypadku Banku Japonii do rangi najważniejszych działań urosły udzielane przez bank centralny bankom komercyjnym specjalne pożyczki mające na celu zwiększenie akcji kredytowej w sektorze realnym japońskiej gospodarki.

Stawiany przez Bank Japonii cel osiągnięcia inflacji powyżej 2% został osiągnięty w kwietniu 2022 r. Stało się tak w dużej mierze za sprawą czynników zewnętrznych, z czego kluczowe wydawały się: wzrost cen surowców oraz deprecjacja jena (odzwierciedlająca różnice stóp procentowych w stosunku do innych dużych gospodarek, takich jak Stany Zjednoczone). Oba czynniki miały jednak charakter przejściowy. Właśnie dlatego przewiduje się, że inflacja może spaść poniżej 2% już na przełomie 2023 i 2024 r. Tego rodzaju prognozy były i są główną przyczyną tego, że Bank Japonii jak dotąd wstrzymuje się od działań na rzecz zacieśniania prowadzonej przez siebie polityki pieniężnej. Taki stan rzeczy doprowadził w ubiegłym roku do znaczącej deprecjacji jena względem dolara, zmuszając Bank Japonii do podjęcia – po raz pierwszy od dziesięciu lat – interwencji walutowych.

Zrozumienie działań Banku Japonii na rzecz zagwarantowania wyznaczonego przez siebie tempa inflacji wydaje się niemożliwe bez uwzględnienia specyfiki zarówno japońskiej gospodarki, jak i japońskiego społeczeństwa. Dlatego w artykule pokrócie opisano elementy, które odróżniają japońską gospodarkę od reszty świata. Nie zmienia to jednak tego, że dalsze kształtowanie się inflacji w Japonii będzie w dużym stopniu zależeć od polityki prowadzonej przez następcę Kurody, czyli Kazuo Ueda.

Słowa kluczowe: polityka pieniężna, kontrola krzywej dochodowości, luzowanie ilościowe i jakościowe, ujemne stopy procentowe, Bank Japonii